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UNIVERSALISM AND THE GREATER GOOD:
REPLY TO GORDON KNIGHT
Thomas Talbott

Gordon Knight recently challenged my assumption, which I made for the purpose of organizing and classifying certain theological disputes, that a specific
set of three propositions is logically inconsistent (or necessarily false). In this
brief rejoinder, I explain Knight's objection and show why it rests upon a misunderstanding.

In a previous article I assumed, for the purpose of organizing and classifying certain theological disputes, that the following set of propositions, call it
set A, is logically inconsistent:
(1)

(2)
(3)

It is God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his
will) to reconcile all sinners to himself;
It is within God's power to achieve his redemptive purpose for
the world;
Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will
therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment,
from which there will be no hope of escape, or put them out of
existence altogether. '

In calling set A logically inconsistent, I did not mean to imply, of course,
that it contains a formal contradiction; I meant to imply only that the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) is necessarily false, or metaphysically impossible,
or not possible in Plantinga's broadly logical sense. If that is true, then at
least one of these propositions is false and we can therefore classify theologians according to which of the three propositions they finally reject. Nor is
it usually very difficult, I suggested, to identify which proposition a given
theologian rejects.
According to Gordon Knight, however, it is a mistake to regard set A as
necessarily false. In a recent response to my article, Knight makes two
assumptions for which he provides no argument: first, that something like a
conflict of desires is possible for God, and second, that God's redemptive
purpose for the world (logically) could come into conflict with some other
overriding purpose. From the perspective of these assumptions, he then
diagnoses my "error" as follows:
Suppose ... that Jones is Vice President, and has it in his power to
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assassinate the President. I do not think that the mere fact that Jones
has the purpose of becoming president entails that he will assassinate
the President in order to do so. This is because the statement "It is Mr.
Jones' purpose to become President" does not exclude Jones from
having other purposes which may in some way conflict with the
means necessary to achieve this end. Similarly, I suggest the statement "It is God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his
will) to reconcile all sinners to himself" does not entail that God could
not have an overriding purpose that prevents him from using all possible means for achieving this end. If God does have an overriding
purpose, then while God may desire the salvation of all, and while it
may be in God's power to do so, it may still be that all are not saved. 2
I am grateful to Knight for expressing in print a reservation about my article that others have also expressed to me in private. But the reservation that
Knight and others have expressed does rest, I think it fair to say, upon a misunderstanding. For as Knight himself points out/ I would reject his interpretation of proposition (1). Indeed, I would simply stipulate that God's
redemptive purpose for the world includes everything that he regards as
most important; hence, it is by definition a purpose that overrides all others.4
If God regards it to be of utmost importance that he achieve justice in the
end, for example, then that is part of his redemptive purpose for the world;
and if he also regards it to be of utmost importance that he preserve human
freedom, then that too is part of his redemptive purpose for the world. In
the latter case, we might describe his redemptive purpose this way: It is his
overriding purpose (and therefore his will) to achieve a state of affairs in
which all sinners freely repent of their sins. Whether God has the power to
achieve this purpose is, of course, a further question. But if God desires the
salvation of all in any intelligible sense and also desires to preserve hmnan
freedom in this matter, then his redemptive purpose for the world is simply
a combination of the two: It is his overriding purpose of bringing it about (in
Plantinga's weak sense) that all are reconciled to him freely.
Accordingly, as I understand (and use) the expression, "God's redemptive purpose for the world," (1) above entails
(1*) It is God's overriding purpose for the world to reconcile all sinners to himself.
And though Knight seems to anticipate this move, his response is perplexing, to say the least. He writes: "But this proposition is only plausible if it is
reasonable to assume that God does not have any purpose that could override the goal of universal salvation,"s and he then goes on to suggest that
God's purpose of producing a greater good could conflict with his desire to
save all." In what way is this even relevant, however, to the question of
whether set A is, as I have claimed, logically inconsistent (or necessarily
false)? If the set is logically inconsistent, after all, then at least one proposition in the set is false. So how can Knight, or anyone else, contest my claim
of logical inconsistency by arguing that one of the propositions in Anamely, proposition (1) when construed so as to entail (1 *)-is implausible
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(or even false)? Certainly Knight is right about this: It is God's overriding
purpose to accomplish a given end, whatever the end might be, only if he
has no other overriding purpose that is incompatible with this one. But a
tautology such as that provides no grounds for challenging my assumption
that set A is logically inconsistent.
Given Knight's own apparent theology and his attraction to the Free Will
Defense, moreover, I see no reason why he should regard (1 *) as false or
implausible. Indeed, his stated reasons for challenging (1*) are not reasons
for challenging (1 *) at all; they are instead reasons, grounded in a libertarian
conception of free will, for challenging proposition (2). His trouble begins,
as I see it, when he interprets (1*) as if it were saying that God's redemptive
purpose is "to reconcile all sinners to himself at all costS."7 How are we to
understand the "at all costs" in the present context? If a free decision of
some kind is an essential part of the reconciliation that God seeks to
achieve, as Knight and other Arminians believe, then there can be no question of God reconciling someone against the person's own will and no question of God achieving reconciliation by overriding the relevant freedom; the
very idea would be incoherent and therefore logically impossible. True reconciliation, so the Arminian will insist, cannot coincide with either enslavement or any form of determinism that overwhelms human free \-\'ill. Given
Knight's own understanding of reconciliation, therefore, it would seem that
(1 *) is at least roughly equivalent to
0**) It is God's overriding purpose for the world to bring it about
(weakly) that all sinners freely repent of their sin and are thus
freely reconciled to God.
And I seriously doubt, based upon what I have read in his article, that
Knight really wants to reject (1 **). His quarrel, as I have said, seems to be
with proposition (2). Because he regards free will and determinism as
incompatible, it is possible, he believes, that God does not have the power
to bring it about (weakly) that all sinners freely repent of their sins.
In any event, perhaps Knight will agree with me that the conjtmction of
(1 **) with (2) and (3), call it set B, is indeed necessarily false. But then, if set
B is necessarily false and (1) entails (1 **), then set A (the conjunction of (1)
with (2) and (3» is necessarily false as well. I conclude, therefore, that
Knight has failed to mount a successful challenge to my assumption that set
A is necessarily false.
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NOTES
1. Thomas Talbott, "Three Pictures of God in Western Theology," Faith and
Philosophy 12 (1995), p. 79.
2. Gordon Knight, "Universalism and the Greater Good: A Response to
Talbott," Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997), pp. 98-99. (Note: Page 98 seems mistakenly to have been printed as page 100.)
3. Ibid., p. 99.
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4. Elsewhere I have indicated that, although I do not accept a doctrine of
divine simplicity, I do accept the simplicity of God's moral nature: the idea that
God's holiness, justice, mercy, etc. are in fact one and the same attribute.
Because God's mercy requires everything that his justice requires, for example,
and his justice permits everything that his mercy permits, it is logically impossible that his desire to be merciful should ever come into conflict with his desire
to be just (see "Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine Justice," Religious Studies
(September, 1993). But since that is a controversial view concerning the nature
of God, I shall not insist upon it here. For here it is enough merely to point out
how I am using the expression, "God's redemptive purpose for the world."
5. Op. cit., p. 99.
6. Ibid., p. 100.
7. Ibid. Italics are Knight's own.

